Abstract. In the last decade, a revolution has occurred in access to census microdata for social and behavioral research. More than 325 million person records (55 countries, 159 samples) representing two-thirds of the world's population are now readily available to bona fide researchers from the IPUMS-International website:
Introduction
A revolution occurred in access to population census microdata for social and behavioral research in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The most successful initiative, with the cooperation of some 85 National Statistical Agencies world-wide, is the IPUMSInternational project led by the Minnesota Population Center (MPC, Figure 1 ). first integrated into the database. Moreover, these countries have long series of censuses with extant microdata stretching back to the 1960s. Finally, the samples are rich, with at least 50 person variables and 10 household or dwelling variables.
At the PSD2006, we laid out the statistical disclosure controls to protect the privacy of persons, households and other entities developed on the first 47 samples integrated into the IPUMS-International database [1] . In this paper we describe how the legal, administrative and technical procedures are being implemented to protect privacy and statistical confidentiality and, thus, to facilitate access to this massive trove of data. Restricting access to trusted users is the key to our success. To date, there have been no allegations of misuse of IPUMS-International census microdata extracts. On the contrary, what is most remarkable is the substantial usage by researchers, given the fact that the usability of "public use" microdata is sometimes deemed "limited" [2] . Despite the "PU" in the IPUMS acronym, "RA," "TU," or "SA" might be more appropriate because the data are disseminated as "restricted access," "trusted user," or "scientific access" files [3, 1] .
Thwarting Intruders
The casual intruder (and casual user) is readily thwarted by the IPUMS-International registration form and policy statements. At 1,100 words, the IPUMS form is considerably shorter than the 5,830 words that constitute the FACEBOOK privacy policy, but, unlike FACEBOOK (where most registrants click "I agree" without reading the small print), the IPUMS registration requires the applicant to agree to each of eight detailed conditions of use. Failure to agree to even one condition results in an automatic rejection of the registration. The successful applicant provides not only personal details, but also must identify institutional affiliation, including name, official email address and phone number, web-link identifying affiliation, name and email of supervisor, the name, title and other pertinent information of any grant used to conduct the research and, most importantly, the name of "an Institutional Review Board (IRB), or Office for Human Subject Protections, Professional Conduct or similar committee." Applications that omit this information are reviewed, but a positive decision is delayed until bona-fides are explained and verified. Perhaps the biggest obstacle for a successful application is the research project description, which is carefully scrutinized to confirm that access to the database is needed for the proposed research. A researcher may possess adequate technical and professional qualifications, but if there is no research need for the microdata, access will be denied. Approximately one-third of completed applications are denied.
Incomplete registrations-those that are begun and but never submitted-go uncounted, but it is likely that their number is not inconsiderable.
The rogue intruder-armed with the appropriate bona-fides but with malevolent intent-faces legal and institutional sanctions as well as substantial technical obstacles. If the violation occurs in the United States, the intruder risks civil prosecution with a maximum fine of US$250,000 and/or three years imprisonment. Elsewhere, since the laws of the country in which the violation occurs would apply, the discretion to prosecute would rest with the National Statistical Authority. The legal counsel of the University of Minnesota is committed to providing vigorous legal assistance. This threat of legal action is probably less a deterrent than institutional and professional sanctions. The IPUMS Case Study in [4, Annex 1.23] describes the sanctions as follows:
1. "sanctions against both the individual and the institution with which the individual is associated (e.g., University, international organization) [would be imposed]; 2. "denial of access would immediately be invoked against the individual and his/her institution and would continue until corrective measures were deemed to be sufficient by the University of Minnesota and the National Statistical Office whose data were violated. If the institution where the breach occurred was the recipient of a grant from the National Institutes of Health of the United States, each researcher at the institution could be required to undergo Human Subjects Protection training and re-certification before access was re-instituted for individuals at that institution." Commercial researchers are prohibited from accessing the data. Some petition for access, but are denied because of the restriction to non-commercial users. None seek access to identify individuals. Instead, commercial users often require population statistics that are not readily obtainable elsewhere, such as to compute weights or expansion factors for specific population sub-groups. There is no interest by commercial or other entities in linking confidentialized population census samples to other sources because much more valuable data are readily available elsewhere. Then too, leaving aside the difficulties of constructing successful links, sample microdata are too ordinary to excite the slightest interest for the purpose of linking.
Statistical Disclosure Controls
Threats to privacy and statistical confidentiality by intruders have long provided the rationale for National Statistical Offices to simply deny access to census microdata, regardless of the professional qualifications and scientific needs of would-be researchers. IPUMS International is successful in overcoming these objections because our procedures are designed to thwart intruders, first, by screening to permit trusted researchers to use the data while denying access to potential intruders; second, by erecting strong sanctions against misuse; and, third, by imposing stringent statistical disclosure controls. We endorse the standard of the Office of National Statistics (UK) [5] that statistical controls should be such that it "would take a disproportionate amount of time, effort and expertise for an intruder to identify a statistical unit to others, or to reveal information about that unit not already in the public domain." Population census variables are mundane. Census attributes are relatively crude in comparison to the details available in employment or health surveys. IPUMS-International suppresses variables considered to be sensitive by the official statistical agency, but to date, there has been only one such request: "tribe" for a census from an African country, where ethnic violence is a grave concern.
Census operations produce a considerable amount of data that is less than perfect. Editing and imputation are necessary to produce coherent datasets. Few statistical agencies report the details. The rich samples of the 2001 population census microdata of the United Kingdom make it possible to assess the degree of imputation and of perturbation-the introduction of intentional error to protect confidentiality in the data. The ONS relied upon the Post Randomization Method (PRAM) to produce the 2001 Licenses Individual SAR. De Kort and Wathan [6] compared the Individual Controlled Access Microdata Sample (not perturbed) with the Licensed Individual SAR (perturbednote that this is the sample integrated into IPUMS-International) and discovered that the relative frequency of imputation was several times greater than perturbation. Of the twelve variables analyzed, the authors found that for "Social Grade of Reference Person" 15% of attributes were imputed, versus 2% perturbed. For "Age" imputation and perturbation were roughly the same at 1%. The frequency of perturbations was typically less than one percent, whereas imputations for five variables were 5% or more. For researchers inclined to ignore the imputed data, de Kort and Wathan warn that "raw data are not necessarily to be preferred." The ONS-UK is to be lauded for producing flags to indicate imputation for every variable in its samples. Flags empower researchers to gauge the effects of imputation and editing and take appropriate action.
Purdam and Elliott [7] carried the analysis a step farther to assess the effects of perturbation on published analyses. Thanks to the ability to replicate certified samples such as the SARS and the CAMS, replication of research results can be accomplished with a degree of confidence. Their findings are disconcerting for researchers: "disclosure control measures had a significant impact on the usability of the data (analytical completeness) and on the accuracy of the data in relation to the findings reached when the data were used in analyses (analytical validity)."
As in the case of the 2001 SARS, a few statistical agencies entrust samples that have already been subjected to privacy protections. Sometimes these go seriously awry, as in the case of the United States PUMS [8] . Beginning with datasets from 2000 through 2008, serious errors were introduced into the public use files for males and females aged 65 years and over. Due to a programming error, statistical disclosure controls corrupted age attributes so that published distributions differed from those computed from microdata samples by as much as 15%. Three series of microdata samples were corrupted: the 2000 census, the American Community Survey (2003-6), and the Current Population Survey (2004-9) [9] . Despite the uproar in the media only one dataset was corrected, and some researchers fear that the correction may actually make matters worse.
Most statistical offices entrust "raw" microdata to the IPUMS-International project (not truly raw because names and addresses are stripped out thereby anonymizing the data before shipment). In Table 1 , these instances are identified by "IPUMS" in the column headed "Confidentiality Protocols". In such cases, we apply a series of straightforward SDC measures. First, the data are anonymized by suppressing any names, addresses, or precise geographic identifiers. Second, a sample is drawn so that researchers have access to only a minor fraction of the complete dataset. Third, additional disclosure protections are imposed on the sample, variable-by-variable and code-by-code. Finally, a small fraction of households is swapped across geographic boundaries.
Our procedures are summarized in a contract with one of our statistical agency partners, as follows:
(1) Detailed geographic codes will be suppressed. (2) Any geographical unit with fewer than 20,000 individuals will be aggregated to the next highest geographical unit. (3) Any social characteristic (categorical variables such as place of birth, occupation, etc.) with fewer than 250 individuals in the population will be recoded as missing, suppressed or aggregated. (4) Continuous variables (such as income, size of rooms, etc.) will be top/bottom coded to prevent identification of individuals or other entities with unique characteristics. (5) The geographical identifiers of a fraction of households will be recoded to a different geographical unit so that any allegation that an individual or other entity is positively identified is false. Swapping of individuals and households across geographical boundaries (that is, editing the geographical identifiers of a small fraction of individuals and households to one that is false) introduces uncertainty into any attempts at identification.
The thresholds in this contract are those usually authorized by most statistical agencies that entrust "raw" microdata to the IPUMS-International project. Nonetheless, the thresholds may be adjusted at the request of the National Statistical Office-owner. For example, in the case of France, place of residence is limited to 22 regions. The smallest region has a population exceeding 80,000 in the 1990 census (sample n > 4,000). The population count for any identifiable single year of age is >2000.
For any identifiable country of citizenship the threshold is also >2000. Recently, INSEE, the French national statistical authority, began a reconsideration of these thresholds, particularly for the historical datasets that are now more than a decade old. A comprehensive assessment is being prepared to develop lower thresholds so that detailed attributes may be made available for several key variables, such as place of residence, country of birth, occupation, and industry.
During the process of confidentializing international microdata at the Minnesota Population Center, all work is performed by senior staff who have taken the appropriate training and signed official statements to protect the data. Once the statistical disclosure controls are in place, junior staff may begin integrating the microdata. Original source microdata, whether "raw" or confidentialized, are encrypted and archived off-line and thus are preserved in case there are questions about errors introduced by the SDCs. To date there have been no queries about the validity of any IPUMS samples. Errors have been discovered-some due to the integration and others in the source microdata, but none attributed to the process of confidentializing samples.
An Evaluation of Security
Statistical data privacy is more than simply SDC. All procedures and processes associated with the microdata must be secure and must be perceived as such by the public. With the large stock of international microdata archived at the Minnesota Population Center, protecting these assets is a major concern of the Center, the University, and official statistical agencies, international as well as national-whether associated with the project or not.
The first author of this paper invited Mr. Dennis Trewin to conduct an on-site inspection of the IPUMS-International facilities and procedures [10] . Mr. Trewin is well qualified for the undertaking. As Australian Statistician one of his achievements was the extension of microdata services to researchers while maintaining public trust and abiding by the conditions outlined in the legislation of Australia governing microdata access. Mr. Trewin's recommendations to IPUMS-International for enhancing security and data confidentiality are, indeed, "limited". Nonetheless all have been or are being implemented, including his recommendation that "checks should be made of published outputs from time to time to provide some assessment of whether there has been any inappropriate use of microdata (e.g., reference to individual cases)."
Conclusion
The goals of IPUMS-International are, first, to recover census microdata that are at risk of loss; second, to archive microdata; and third, to disseminate confidentialized, custom-tailored, integrated extracts to researchers world-wide at no cost. In the first decade of operations, more than 3,700 researchers registered for access, a vast trove of microdata was entrusted to the Minnesota Population Center, and 159 datasets underwent the arduous process of confidentializing the microdata and integrating both data and documentation into the IPUMS-International system. Over the next five years, an additional hundred datasets are likely to be integrated into the IPUMS-International system. Academics and policy makers needing census microdata for research are invited to visit the project website: www.ipums.org/international. 
